

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00  
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 ERDA-05 EUR-12 H-01 INR-07  
IO-13 L-03 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01  
SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /083 W  
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O R 110959Z JUL 77  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2268  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0385

FROM MBFR REPRESENTATIVE

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM NATO  
SUBJ: MBFR: EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POSITION ON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS

1. UK REP INFORMED US ON JULY 7 THAT, IN BILATERAL CONVERSATION WITH UK REP AND VISITING FON OFF OFFICIAL PATRICK MOBERLY SAME DAY, SOVIET REP TARASOV PRESENTED FOLLOWING CONCEPT ON COLLECTIVITY AS HIS PERSONAL IDEA: (1) EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT ON EACH SIDE WOULD REDUCE BY A STATED AGREED NUMBER; (2) AFTER THAT, A COLLECTIVE CEILING WOULD GO INTO EFFECT FOR EACH SIDE; (3) THERE WOULD BE NO SEPARATE LIMITATIONS ON ANY PARTICIPANT INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION; (4) EACH SIDE WOULD DEAL WITH ITS OWN FORCES WITHIN THE COLLECTIVE CEILING. AS OF THAT TIME, UK REP HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS POINT WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS, SO DISCRETION SHOULD BE USED IN REFERRING TO IT.

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2. COMMENT: THIS IS LATEST STEP IN GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN DIRECTION OF FULL COLLECTIVITY. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, IN THE PLENARY SESSION OF JUNE 30, THE POLISH REP, SPEAKING FOR THE WARSAW PACT, STATED THAT THE EAST WAS READY TO EXAMINE COMPROMISE PROPOSALS OTHER THAN COLLECTIVE CEILINGS TO DEAL WITH A SITUATION WHERE, AFTER AN AGREEMENT IS IMPLEMENTED, THERE IS A FURTHER UNILATERAL REDUCTION ON ONE SIDE. DESPITE

ITS REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS THIS STATEMENT IS AT THE MINIMUM A FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO HAVE A COMPROMISE WHICH MOVES AWAY FROM PURE NATIONAL CEILINGS. (US MBFR AIRGRAM 96 OF JULY 8, NOW EN ROUTE, CONTAINS A RECORD OF EARLIER EASTERN BILATERAL COMMENTS ON THIS TOPIC.)

3. THE CURRENT QUOTE OFFICIAL UNQUOTE BILATERAL SOVIET POSITION GOES FURTHER. IT IS THAT THE USSR WILL NOT ACCEPT THE WESTERN POSITION CALLING FOR COLLECTIVITY IF THAT POSITION ALSO ENTAILS A SUBLIMIT ON SOVIET FORCES AND THAT, IF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WANT COLLECTIVITY, THEY SHOULD THEMSELVES TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO MAKE PROPOSALS WHICH TAKE THIS SOVIET VIEWPOINT INTO ACCOUNT.

4. TARASOV'S PERSONAL SUGGESTION GOES FURTHER THAN THIS. WE BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW MAY HAVE DECIDED TO ACCEPT COLLECTIVITY ON THE CONDITION THAT THE WEST DROPS THE SUBLIMIT ON THE SOVIETS BUT THAT THE EASTERN EUROPEANS MAY HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO DROP COMPLETELY A LIMIT ON THE FEDERAL GERMANS. FOR THAT REASON THE SOVIET DELEGATION MAY BE UNDER SOME CONSTRAINT IN PUTTING FORTH A POSITION ACCEPTING FULL COLLECTIVITY. NONETHELESS, WE EXPECT SOVIETS TO CONTINUE TO ADVANCE THE TARASOV SUGGESTION, PERHAPS IN MORE OFFICIAL FORM. TARASOV EARLIER MENTIONED A SIMILAR IDEA TO US REP. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY ALREADY HAVE MADE SIMILAR SUGGESTIONS TO THE FRG AND THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT OR FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER MAY RAISE THE IDEA IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSING COLLECTIVITY DURING THEIR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO  
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WASHINGTON.

5. AS BACKGROUND WHICH MIGHT BE DRAWN ON IF THIS ISSUE ARISES, WE SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DROPPING FROM THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION THE DEMAND FOR A SUBMLIMIT ON SOVIET MANPOWER DEPLOYED IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

(1) IT IS UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED IN THE WEST THAT THE SOVIETS ARE THE MAIN SOURCE OF THE WARSAW PACT THREAT TO NATO AND THAT THE MILITARY ROLE AND VALUE OF THE EASTERN EUROPEANS IS SECONDARY.

(2) THE NATO MBFR PARTICIPANTS HAVE AGREED (CM 73 (83), PARA 11) THAT, GIVEN THE SUPERIORITY OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN THAT AREA MUST BE A PRIMARY AIM OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

(3) THE ALLIES HAVE ALSO AGREED (CM 73(83), PARA 36) THAT PHASE I LIMITS ON THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT.

(4) BUT, IF MANPOWER CEILINGS ON WARSAW PACT FORCES ARE LIMITED

TO COLLECTIVE CEILINGS ON THE PACT'S TOTAL MANPOWER THIS WOULD PERMIT A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE OF SOVIET COMBAT STRENGTH IN THE REDUCTION AREA EVEN AFTER INITIAL REDUCTIONS.

(5) THE SOVIETS COULD FOR EXAMPLE PREVAIL ON THE POLES OR CZECHS TO DECREASE A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF THEIR REAR ECHELON MILITARY PERSONNEL AND REPLACE THEM WITH CIVILIANS AS NATO HAS ALREADY DONE TO A LARGE EXTENT.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0385

FROM MBFR REPRESENTATIVE

(6) THERE MIGHT BE SOME POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE SOVIETS AGAINST CARRYING OUT SUCH AN ACTION IN ONE RAPID MOVE, BUT THESE CHANGES COULD BE MADE GRADUALLY OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS UNDER THE LABEL OF A FORCE REORGANIZATION PROGRAM.

(7) THIS STEP WOULD NOT REDUCE THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN FORCE OR FORCES CONCERNED.

(8) THE SOVIETS COULD THEN LEGALLY INCREASE THEIR FRONT LINE COMBAT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA BY THE AMOUNT OF THE POLISH OR CZECH DECREASE. IN ADDITION, THEY WOULD DO THIS BY MERELY REDEPLOYING EXISTING MILITARY MANPOWER FROM THE WESTERN USSR. SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE ADJACENT SOVIET UNION WOULD BE

UNDER NO LIMITATION AND COULD ALSO INCREASE.

(9) THUS, THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AS A WHOLE  
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IN THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD BE INCREASED.

(10) CONSEQUENTLY, WARSAW PACT CAPABILITY FOR NON-REINFORCED  
ATTACK WITH MINIMUM PREPARATION, WHICH WOULD LARGELY INVOLVE  
SOVIET FORCES, WOULD ALSO BE INCREASED.

(11) AT THE SAME TIME THE OVERALL LEVEL OF THE FORCES OF  
NATO PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTION AREA COULD NOT BE INCREASED  
TO OFFSET THE SOVIET INCREASE. NOR DOES THE SAME POTENTIAL EXIST  
IN NATO FORCES FOR FURTHER CIVILIANIZATION OF REAR ECHELONS.

(12) THE WEST WOULD IN EFFECT HAVE PAID WITH REDUCTION OF  
MILITARILY VALUABLE US AND WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES FOR CONVERSION  
OF SOME WARSAW PACT REAR ECHELON PERSONNEL TO CIVILIAN STATUS.

(13) GIVEN THE COMMON CEILING LIMITATION, RETURN OF US FORCES  
TO CENTREAL EUROPE WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF SOME OTHER NATO  
COUNTRY REDUCED ITS FORCES AND MIGHT ENCOUNTER CONSIDERABLE  
POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE US IN ANY EVENT BECAUSE IT  
WOULD CONSTITUTE REVERSE BURDEN SHARING.

(14) AS A RESULT OF SUCH DEVELOPMENTS, THE COMBAT CAPABILITY  
OF WESTERN FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED AS COMPARED WITH THAT  
OF WARSAW PACT FORCES.

(15) THE ELIMINATION OF A SUBLIMIT ON THE SOVIETS AND US  
WOULD ELIMINATE THE CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR VERIFICATION OF  
THE MANPOWER LEVELS OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES THROUGH OBSERVERS.  
SINCE THERE HAS BEEN OPPOSITION TO VERIFICATION OF WESTERN  
EUROPEAN FORCES, THE RESULT MIGHT BE NO VERIFICATION OTHER THAN  
NATIONAL MEANS.

(16) IF THE SOVIETS MOVE TO A POSITION FAVORING ONLY  
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COLLECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY MANPOWER, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT  
THEY WILL IN DUE COURSE ALSO ADVOCATE ONLY COLLECTIVE  
LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS FOR THE EAST AND REQUIRE COLLECTIVE  
ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS FOR THE WEST.

(17) SINCE THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO REJECT ANY

LIMITATIONS ON THEIR ARMAMENTS, THE NET RESULT MIGHT BE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE TO ANY ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS. THIS IN TURN MIGHT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO LARGER MANPOWER REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING, OFFSET BY THE PROPOSED REDUCTION OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.

(18) IN THIS CASE, THE WEST WOULD ALSO NOT HAVE ACHIEVED A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TANKS AND THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE SHARPLY REDUCED.

(19) IT IS CLEAR THAT AN MBFR AGREEMENT ON ABOVE LINES WOULD PERMIT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WOULD DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY.

(20) CONSEQUENTLY, THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON BOTH COLLECTIVITY AND A SUB-LIMIT ON SOVIET MANPOWER AND TANKS.

(21) IF THE EAST SHOULD AT SOME POINT FORMALLY ACCEPT COLLECTIVITY BUT DEMAND THAT THE WEST DROP THE SUBCEILING ON THE SOVIETS, THE WEST SHOULD WELCOME THE EASTERN MOVE TOWARD COLLECTIVITY AND CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A SUBCEILING ON SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA. RESOR

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